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A LICENSE TO LIE: THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT'S SAFE HARBOR FOR
FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS DOES NOT
PROTECT FALSE OR MISLEADING STATEMENTS
WHEN MADE WITH MEANINGFUL CAUTIONARY
LANGUAGE
AnandDas+
The single disjunctive term "or" has toppled one of the basic goals of federal
securities laws: "to protect investors."' The federal securities laws seek to
promote investor protection by providing public companies with a guide as to
what information they may, must, and must not disclose.2 Disclosure not only
benefits the investor, but also leads to efficiency in the capital markets by
lessening the need for government regulation.3  Federal regulation of the
securities markets was a response to the 1929 stock market crash and the
following Great Depression-a time when defrauding investors was highly
prevalent.4 As a result, Congress enacted the federal securities laws "to foster
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1. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The Supreme Court has held that
the [securities] acts were designed 'to protect investors against fraud and . . . to promote ethical
standards of honesty and fair dealing."' (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195
(1976))); see also Walter C. Somol, Dredging the Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking
Statements-An Analysis of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's Safe Harbor for
Forward-Looking Statements, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 265, 266 (1998) ("The essential,
continuing goals of the Securities Act of 1933 . . . and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 . . . are to protect investors, promote disclosure of information to investors, and ensure
confidence in the securities markets." (citations omitted)).
2. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 (2003) (stating that federal securities laws
help align the "asymmetr[y]" among companies and investors with regard to information gaps by
requiring "extensive disclosures"); see also Jennifer O'Hare, Director Communications and the
Uneasy Relationship Between the Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-fraud Provisions of
the Federal Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 475, 479 (2002) (finding that, in addition to
mandatory and voluntary requirements, anti-fraud provisions in the federal securities laws seek to
prohibit companies from making false statements in their disclosures as well).
3. See Paredes, supra note 2, at 418 (discussing how disclosure better equips an investor to
guard against corporate fraud, and thus lessens the need for government intervention).
4. Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of the
Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 534 (1999). State
"Blue-Sky" laws, which regulated financial markets prior to the enactment of the federal
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fair play and insure the integrity of the markets."5 The Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)
equipped regulators and injured investors with anti-fraud provisions, which
were designed to ensure the trustworthiness and accuracY of disclosed
information,7 thus leading to integrity in the capital markets. Although the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws prohibit the making of
materially false or misleading statements,9 section 21E(c) of the Exchange Act
not only permits, but in fact protects certain forward-looking statements even if
they are false or misleading.
Section 21E(c) provides a "safe harbor" for public companies making
forward-looking statements" provided that the companies adhere to certain
parameters set forth in the statute.' 2 It is within the language and structure of
securities laws had limited jurisdiction, limited enforcement procedures, and many exemptions.
Veronica H. Montagna, The First Prong of the Safe Harbor Provision of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act: Can it Still Provide Shelter From the Storm in the Wake ofAsher v. Baxter
International Inc.?, 58 RUTGERS L. REv. 511, 515 (2006).
5. Welle, supra note 4, at 535.
6. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006) (offering a private right of
action for registration statements containing false or misleading statements); Id. § 12(a)(2), 15
U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (giving rise to a private right of action for materially misleading statements in a
prospectus or oral communication); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(prohibiting the use of any manipulative or deceptive device when buying or selling securities);
Id. § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (creating a private right of action for anyone who relied on knowingly
misleading statements).
7. O'Hare, supra note 2, at 479 (explaining how the anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws set forth safeguards to ensure the disclosure of information is "complete and
accurate").
8. Paredes, supra note 2, at 422.
9. See O'Hare, supra note 2, at 479-80 (noting that Rule lOb-5, the general anti-fraud
provision of the federal securities laws, prohibits companies from making "a material
misrepresentation or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of a security").
10. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21E, 15 U.S.C. § 78u5 (2006).
11. Id § 21E(c). A "forward-looking" statement is defined by the Exchange Act to mean:
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including income loss),
earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital
structure, or other financial terms;
(B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future operations,
including plans or objectives relating to the products or services of the issuer;
(C) a statement of future economic performance, including any such statement
contained in a discussion and analysis of financial condition by the management or in
the results of operations included pursuant to the rules and regulations of the [SEC];
(D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement described
in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C);
(E) any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer, to the extent that the
report assesses a forward-looking statement made by the issuer; or
(F) a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other items as may be
specified by rule or regulation of the [SEC].
Id. § 21E(i)(1).
12. See id § 21 E(c). The requirements of the "safe harbor" apply:
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those parameters that the current conflict exists, pitting a plain language
interpretation against a logical outcome.13 Congress, by including a
disjunctive term among the requirements necessary to qualify for coverage
under section 21E(c),14 essentially tolerates the making of false or misleading
statements so long as they are made with "meaningful cautionary" language.
To fully appreciate this anomaly, the text and structure of the federal statute
must be further explored.
The Exchange Act, which encompasses section 21E(c), governs securities
trading and establishes the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the
federal regulatory authority in charge of enforcing the federal securities laws.16
The safe harbor for
[I]n any private action arising under this title that is based on an untrue statement of a
material fact or omission of a material fact necessary to make the statement not
misleading, [an issuer] . . . shall not be liable with respect to any forward-looking
statement, whether written or oral, if and to the extent that-
(A) the forward-looking statement is-
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that
could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-
looking statement; or
(ii) immaterial; or
(B) the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking statement-
(i) if made by a natural person, was made with actual knowledge
by that person that the statement was false or misleading; or
(ii) if made by a business entity; was-
(1) made by or with the approval of an executive officer of
that entity; and
(II) made or approved by such officer with actual
knowledge by that officer that the statement was false
or misleading.
Id.
13. See In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 211-12 (1st Cir. 2005)
(recognizing that the plain language of the safe-harbor provision appears ambiguous, but, in
application, protects statements that may be false or misleading-a result contrary to the goals of
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws).
14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(c).
15. Id. § 21E(c)(1)(A)(i).
16. Id. § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (establishing the Securities and Exchange Commission
and outlining its composition, which must include five commissioners, appointed by the President
and approved by the Senate); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A
NUTSHELL 196 (10th ed. 2009) (explaining that both the Exchange Act and SEC regulate
securities brokers and securities markets); Montagna, supra note 4, at 516 (describing the SEC's
broad oversight and enforcement authority, noting its power to conduct investigations and bring
enforcement actions against alleged violations, while also "accept[ing] filings for registration of
securities, proxy solicitations and periodic disclosures by companies subject to the reporting
requirements of the Exchange Act"); Roland L. Redmond, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
An Experiment in Administrative Law, 47 YALE. L.J. 622, 624 (1938) ("The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 has four main purposes: first, the regulation of securities exchanges; second, the
prevention of the excessive use of credit for speculation; third, the prevention of manipulation;
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forward-looking statements entered statutory existence with the Passage of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). To prevent
abusive litigation, Congress amended the Exchange Act to include section
21E(c) as a safe harbor for certain types of forward-looking statements.' 8
Congress also included section 21E(c) as part of the Exchange Act because of
the existing common law bespeaks-caution doctrine.19
Section 21E(c) does not protect all forward-looking statements; 20 rather, the
safe harbor protects only those statements specifically enumerated within the
provision. The safe harbor provides protection for a written or oral
and fourth, the disclosure of adequate information in regard to securities dealt in on exchanges."
(citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 5-10, 12-13, 19)).
17. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)); Somol, supra note 1, at 275-76
(discussing how the PSRLA included a safe harbor for forward-looking statements to encourage
corporate projections and to equip investors with such information when making investment
decisions).
18. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, § 102, 109 Stat. at 753-54 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5); Somol, supra note 1, at 275-76 (noting that the PSLRA and the
safe-harbor provision help "curb abusive private securities litigation," but also promote the
"dissemination of forward-looking information"); see Marc H. Folladori, Protecting
Forward-Looking Statements: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 1710
PLI/CORP. 549, 558 (2009) ("[The PSLRA] contains a seemingly explicit road map for
protection against private securities fraud litigation based on projections of future results that later
turn out to be inaccurate."). Legislative history for the PSLRA observes:
[The PSLRA] seeks to protect investors, issuers and all who are associated with our
capital markets from abusive securities litigation. This legislation implements needed
procedural protections to discourage frivolous litigation. It protects outside directors,
and others who may be sued for non-knowing securities law violations, from liability
for damage actually caused by others ... [a]nd it establishes a safe harbor for forward
looking statements, to encourage issuers to disseminate relevant information to the
market without fear of open-ended liability.
H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731.
19. Emp'rs. Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Clorox Co., 353 F.3d
1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The PSLRA created a statutory version of [the bespeaks-caution]
doctrine by providing a safe harbor for forward-looking statements identified as such, which are
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements."); see also Stephen M. Muniz, Note, The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Protecting Corporations from Investors,
Protecting Investors from Corporations, and Promoting Market Efficiency, 3 NEW ENG. L. REV.
655, 691 (1997) (asserting that the current statutory safe-harbor provision codifies the
bespeaks-caution doctrine because of the exclusion of forward-looking statements). Although
there is no uniform definition, the bespeaks-caution doctrine is a judicially created mechanism
that immunizes a defendant-corporation from a liability if its securities-related documents
containing "forward-looking representations contain[] enough cautionary language or risk
disclosure." Jonathan L. Booze, Comment, A Comparative Analysis of the Application of the
Bespeaks Caution Doctrine to Forward-Looking Statements, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 495, 501 (1999)
(quoting Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution," 49 BUS. LAW. 481, 483
(1994)).
20. See Securities Exchange Act §§ 21E(c)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i) (requiring that a forward-looking
statement possess sufficient cautionary statements or that the plaintiff fails to show the speaker
knew the forward-looking statement was false or misleading when it was made); id
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forward-looking statement provided, in relevant part, that the statement is:
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied
by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors
that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the
forward-looking statement; or
(ii) immaterial; or
(B) the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking statement-
(i) if made by a natural person, was made with actual knowledge
by that person that the statement was false or misleading. 22
Thus, the statutory provision extends protection to three types of
forward-looking statements, two of which this Comment will focus on.23
Prong A protects an identified forward-looking statement provided it is
"accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements."24 Prong B protects a
forward-looking statement if the plaintiff fails to prove that it was made with
the actual knowledge that the statement was false or misleading.25 Because
prongs A and B are separated by a disjunctive term, the plain language of the
statute appears to support the proposition that Prong A and Prong B are
§ 21 E(b)(2)(C)-(D) (prohibiting protection under the safe harbor for forward-looking statements
"made in connection with a tender offer" or "made in connection with an initial public offering").
21. Id. § 21 E(c)(1) (providing the statutory language and framework of the safe harbor).
Many times defendants seeking protection under the statutory safe harbor, are alleged to have
violated Rule 10Ob-5, one of the most utilized anti-fraud provisions in the federal securities laws.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009) (Rule 1Ob-5); Erin M. Hardtke, Comment, What's Wrong With
the Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements? A Call To The Securities and Exchange
Commission to Reconsider Codification of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine, 81 MARQ. L. REV.
133, 133-34 (1997) (stating that forward-looking statements are highly susceptible to fraud
allegations under Rule 10b-5, the "catch-all" anti-fraud provision). A plaintiff alleging a
violation of Rule I Ob-5 of the Exchange Act must satisfy six elements to have a valid cause of
action. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008)
(identifying the six elements as "(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant;
(2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale
of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation").
22. Securities Exchange Act § 21E(c)(1)(A)-(B) (emphasis added).
23. Richard A. Rosen, The Statutory Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements After
Two and a Half Years: Has it Changed the Law? Has it Achieved What Congress Intended?, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 645, 652 (1998) (explaining how the safe harbor for forward-looking statements
shields companies when the forward-looking statement is: (A) "accompanied by meaningful
cautionary language," (B) "immaterial," or (C) the company "lacked the requisite state of mind to
commit fraud"). This Comment will not discuss the materiality test, but it should be noted that
the safe harbor requires that the forward-looking statement at issue be "material" for a civil
litigant to have a claim. Securities Exchange Act § 21E(c)(1)(A)(ii) (applying the safe-harbor
provision to cases involving "an untrue statement of a material fact or omission of a material
fact," but not imposing liability on a person for a forward-looking statement that is "immaterial"
(emphasis added)).
24. Securities Exchange Act § 21E(c)(1)(A)(i).
25. Id § 21E(c)(1)(B).
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independent of one another.26 However, this interpretation begs the question
of whether section 21E(c) protects a forward-looking statement made with the
actual knowledge that it is false or misleading, but which is nonetheless
accompanied with "meaningful cautionary language."27
This Comment addresses the problems accompanying the application of the
plain language of the safe-harbor provision and analyzes the way courts should
interpret section 21 E(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Part I reviews
the regulatory developments preceding the bespeaks-caution doctrine-the
origin and common law equivalent of the current statutory safe-harbor
provision. This section also highlights the legislative history of the safe-harbor
provision and the text of the statute. Part II reviews the divergent case law
interpreting the statutory provision. This Part first examines decisions made
by courts that reject the plain-language interpretation and ultimately prohibit
all false misleading statements. Next, this Part focuses on courts that have
erroneously adhered to the plain-language interpretation, and created the
potential for dissemination of false or misleading information into securities
markets. Part III analyzes why a strict adherence to the text of the statute is not
suitable for evaluating the dissemination of statements in connection with the
sale of securities. This Part also looks to courts that have wrestled with the
language of the statute in an attempt to enact a formidable rule considering
both the plain language of the statute and the practical consequences of
interpreting it as such. Finally, Part IV concludes that adherence to the plain
language of the statute will bring about the illogical result of tolerating false or
misleading statements made in the public marketplace, and that courts should
employ a more practical interpretation by considering Prong A and Prong B of
the safe harbor in conjunction with one another.
I. THE ORIGIN OF THE STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR FOR FORWARD-LOOKING
STATEMENTS: SEC RULE 175 AND THE BESPEAKS-CAUTION DOCTRINE
A complete analysis of the statutory safe-harbor provision requires a
discussion of the regulatory developments prior to the judicially created
bespeaks-caution doctrine. The SEC addressed the notion of protectinr
forward-looking statements before the issue was considered in a court of law.
26. Allan Horwich, Cleaning the Murky Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements: An
Inquiry into Whether Actual Knowledge of Falsity Precludes the Meaningful Cautionary
Statement Defense, 35 J. CORP. L. 519, 539-41 (2010) (discussing cases that rely on a strict
interpretation of the disjunctive language in the statutory safe harbor, and hold that satisfaction of
one prong forecloses the need to analyze the second prong).
27. Securities Exchange Act § 21E(c)(1)(A)-(B) (declaring that the safe-harbor provision's
protection applies when statements are made with sufficient cautionary statements or when the
plaintiff fails to prove that the defendant acted with actual knowledge in making the false
statement (emphasis added)).
28. Royce de R. Barondes, The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: Revisiting the Application of
Federal Securities Law to Opinions and Estimates, 19 J. CORP. L. 243, 247-49 (1994) (discussing
how, before the common law development of the bespeaks-caution doctrine, the SEC initially
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A. The SEC's Consideration ofProtection for Forward-Looking Statements
and the Implementation ofSEC Rule 175
Prior to the 1970s, the SEC prohibited companies from making projections
in documents filed with the Commission.29  The motivating factor for the
prohibition stemmed from the SEC's concern that such information would
potentially misled inexperienced or unsophisticated investors, thus causing
further inequality among investors.30
After taking the original rule under consideration, the SEC formed the
Wheat Commission to determine whether forward-looking statements "should
be permitted or mandated in Commission filings." 31  Although the Wheat
Commission opposed permitting projections,32 the SEC continued to conduct
hearings and receive public comments regarding whether to lift the ban on
forward-looking statements.33  In 1973, the SEC determined that it would
neither mandate disclosure of forward-looking statements, nor prohibit the
prohibited the dissemination of forward-looking statements, but eventually changed that policy in
1979 with the adoption of Rule 175).
29. Id. at 247-48 (reviewing the SEC's established policy of prohibiting projections made in
documents filed with the Commission).
30. See Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Release No. 7101,
Exchange Act Release No. 34831, Investment Company Act Release No. 20619 [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,436 (Oct. 14, 1994) [hereinafter Exchange Act
Release No. 34831] (concluding that forward-looking information was "inherently unreliable, and
that unsophisticated investors would place undue emphasis on the information in making
investment decisions" (citing SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A
REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE 1933 AND 1934 ACTS 96 (1969)
[hereinafter WHEAT REPORT])). The Commission's rationale is best articulated by Harry Heller,
former member of the Commission's Division of Corporate Finance, who stated,
Conjectures and speculations as to the future are left by the Act to the investor on the
theory that he is as competent as anyone to predict the future from the given facts.
Since an expert can speak with authority only as to subjects upon which he has
professional knowledge . . . attempts by companies to predict future earnings on their
own or on the authority of experts have almost invariably been held by the Commission
to be misleading because they suggest to the investor a competence and authority which
in fact does not exist.
Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. LAW. 300,
307 (1961).
31. Exchange Act Release No. 34831, supra note 30 (noting that the Wheat Commission
was created in response to increasing pressure to revoke the SEC's prohibition on
forward-looking statements). The Wheat Commission determined that while investors generally
consider estimates of future earnings, the risk of voluminous litigation, coupled with undue
investor reliance on such information, outweighed any consideration of permitting
forward-looking statements. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 30, at 95-96.
32. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 30, at 96.
33. See Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release
No. 5362, Exchange Act Release No. 9984, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 79,211 (Feb. 2, 1973) (discussing public interest on the topic and detailing the
information gathered from hearings).
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dissemination of such information. 34  In explanation, the SEC revealed an
inclination to follow its own historical policy, stating that it "has never
required a company to publicly disclose its projections.
In 1976, the SEC formed the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure
(Advisory Committee) to analyze policy issues within the Commission's
Division of Corporate Finance.36 Among other issues, the Advisory
Committee addressed forward-looking statements. 37 The Advisory Committee
made a number of recommendations with regard to permitting forward-looking
statements,38 including a requirement that safe-harbor protection would apply
only to forward-looking statements made in good faith and with a reasonable
basis. 39 To guard against misleading projections, the Advisory Committee also
encouraged the SEC to reiterate to companies the need to keep forward-
looking statements reliable and truthful.40
Taking the Advisory Committee report into consideration and incorporating
its recommendations, the SEC promulgated Rule 175 under the Securities Act
and Rule 3b-6 under the Exchange Act.41 These rules protect companies from
liability if they make forward-looking statements in good faith and on a
reasonable basis, so long as the companies originally made the statements in
SEC fillings.42 Section 21E(c) shares some, but not all, of Rule 175's
43requirements.
34. Id (proposing rules permitting, but not mandating, the disclosure of forward-looking
information).
35. Id.
36. Statement on Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic, Securities Act Release No.
5699, Exchange Act Release No. 12371, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
80,461 (Apr. 23, 1976) (noting the SEC's decision to neither encourage nor prohibit protections,
but commenting "that even the most carefully prepared and thoroughly documented projections
may prove inaccurate").
37. Id.
38. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG.,
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 344-45 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE] (encouraging disclosure of projections as well as the need for an accompanying
safe-harbor provision); Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084,
Exchange Act Release No. 15944, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117
(June 25, 1979) (discussing the adoption of a safe-harbor provision for projections).
39. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 38, at 344-45. In the Advisory
Committee's opinion, the burden should be placed on the injured party to show a lack of good
faith or reasonable basis. Id.
40. Id. at 346.
41. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2009); see Barondes, supra note 28, at 248-49 (recognizing the
SEC's decision to follow the Committee's recommendations when adopting the final rule in
1979).
42. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175, 240.3b-6.
43. See Hardtke, supra note 21, at 146-47 ("The safe harbor [of section 21 E] protects only
forward-looking statements, the definition of which was borrowed in large part from Rule 175.
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B. Dicta to Doctrine: The Judicial Uprising of the Bespeaks-Caution Doctrine
In addition to taking into account the SEC's findings and rulemaking, the
current statutory safe harbor also incorporates characteristics of the judicially
44created bespeaks-caution doctrine. A large part of the doctrine's influence on
section 21E may be a result of the doctrine's adoption by "almost all federal
courts of appeals." 45 Although the doctrine originated within a mere footnote
of an Eighth Circuit opinion,4 6 other federal courts have molded the
bespeaks-caution doctrine into its current version.47
1. The Second and Sixth Circuits: The Original Creators of the Federal
Common Law's Bespeaks-Caution Doctrine
The footnote that gave rise to the bespeaks-caution doctrine appeared in
Polin v. Conductron Corp.,48 a case involving a plaintiff who claimed that
allegedly fraudulent statements made in a company's proxy statement, press
release, and reports violated the federal securities laws' anti-fraud provisions.49
The Eighth Circuit responded with a finding that "[t]he terms thus employed
bespeak caution in outlook and fall far short of the assurances required for a
finding of falsity and fraud.",0
The bespeaks-caution doctrine first appeared as a substantive legal rationale
when articulated by the Second Circuit in Goldman v. Belden.5 Using the
bespeaks-caution doctrine in its analysis, the court found that the plaintiff
adequately stated a claim by showing that the defendant had been aware of
negative factors that could impact the company, but nonetheless failed to
include the requisite cautionary language in its forward-looking statements.52
Noting the plaintiffs allegation that "there was no note of caution in the
defendants' statements and the defendants knew caution was warranted,"53 the
But unlike Rule 175, [section 21E] is not limited to documents filed with the SEC; it extends to
any statements within its scope.").
44. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 43 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 742 (observing that the safe-harbor provision is "based on aspects of SEC Rule 175 and the
judicially created 'bespeaks caution' doctrine"); see Hardtke, supra note 21, at 146-48 (noting
that the safe harbor shares its cautionary prong based on the bespeaks-caution doctrine).
45. Booze, supra note 19, at 496.
46. See Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 806 n.28 (8th Cir. 1977); Booze, supra
note 19, at 499 (identifying the Polin opinion as the origin of the doctrine).
47. See Booze, supra note 19, at 499-500; see infra Part 1.B.1.
48. Polin, 552 F.2d at 806 n.28 (emphasis added).
49. Id at 800-03; Barondes, supra note 28, at 251; Booze, supra note 19, at 499.
50. Polin, 552 F.2d at 806 n.28; Barondes, supra note 28, at 251 ("The Bespeaks Caution
Doctrine had its origins in a footnote in Polin v. Conductron Corporation.").
51. Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1068 (2d Cir. 1985).
52. Id at 1068-69 (deciding the bespeaks-caution doctrine did not apply because the
defendant's forward-looking statements contained optimistic predictions but failed to disclose any
knowledge of negative factors).
53. Id. at 1068.
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Second Circuit fashioned a rule requiring that cautionary language accompan 4
forward-looking statements for companies to be protected from liability.
Indeed, today's statutory safe-harbor provision shares this rationale.55
The Sixth Circuit, in Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., ex anded the
bespeaks-caution doctrine to include two additional considerations. First, the
court determined that a company is not liable under Section 10(b) or Rule
I Ob-5 57 if it makes projections in good faith, based on currently available
information. Second, the court found it necessary to analyze whether the
statement was false or misleading at the time it was made.59 The current
statutory safe-harbor provision reflects a partial adoption of this second
consideration. 60
2. The Evolution of the Bespeaks-Caution Doctrine: Interpreting and
Implementing the Bespeaks-Caution Doctrine Following the Second and
Sixth Circuit Decisions
After the Goldman and Sinay opinions, circuit courts have customized the
bespeaks-caution doctrine to deny protection to knowingly false future
projections.61 In Mayer v. Mylod, the Sixth Circuit determined that its earlier
54. See id. at 1068-69 (noting that "not all predictions are actionable" but a company's
financial forecast that "could have conveyed to a reasonable investor the picture of a quite rosy
future" must contain qualifications on the positive projections).
55. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006)
(requiring a defendant seeking protection under the safe-harbor provision to supplement
forward-looking statements with "meaningful cautionary statements").
56. 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991).
57. Id
58. Id (analyzing the forward-looking statements in the context of current economic
information held by the company at the time the statements were made).
59. Id. ("[A] court must scrutinize the nature of the statement to determine whether the
statement was false when made." (citations omitted)).
60. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21 E(c) (requiring the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant had actual knowledge of a forward-looking statement's falsity at the time it was made).
61. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1213 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that
although the forward-looking statements were accompanied by adequate cautionary language, the
bespeaks-caution doctrine would not preclude the claim if the defendants knew the financial
disclosures were false or misleading); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371
(3d Cir. 1993) ("The application of bespeaks caution depends on the specific text of the offering
document or other communication at issue, i.e., courts must assess the communication on a
case-by-case basis."); In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P'ships Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68, 72
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)) ("The doctrine of bespeaks caution provides no protection to someone who
warns his hiking companion to walk slowly because there might be a ditch ahead when he knows
with near certainty that the Grand Canyon lies one foot away."). Additionally, the doctrine does
not apply to statements that were knowingly false when made and may be involved only when the
defendant can point to cautionary language that specifically addresses the challenged statement of
omission. In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at 72. (citing Trump, 7 F.3d at 371-72; Huddleston
v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part on other grounds,
459 U.S. 375 (1983)).
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decision in Sinay conflicted with Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, a case
decided by the United States Supreme Court.62 According to the Sixth Circuit,
the court's analysis in Sinay had stopped short of scrutinizing the misleading
nature of the forward-looking statements.63 Ultimately, the Mayer court
determined that forward-looking statements are protected if accompanied by
meaningful cautionary language, but, when faced with this issue courts must
further analyze the misleading nature of the statements.64
The Tenth Circuit added another wrinkle to the bespeaks-caution
jurisprudence by requiring "materiality." 65 In Grossman v. Novell, Inc., the
Tenth Circuit adopted the bespeaks-caution doctrine as a "valid defense to a
securities fraud claim." 66  The court expanded the doctrine's protection to
cases where the cautionary language appeared in another document separate
from the document containing the allegedly false forward-looking statements.
According to one commentator, Grossman's expansion of the bespeaks-caution
doctrine "lacks both legal and logical justification."6 8
Although the bespeaks-caution doctrine continues to exist at common law,
Congress has created a statutory "safe harbor" for forward-looking statements
within the federal securities laws.69
62. See Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Va. Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097-99 (1991).
63. Mayer, 988 F.2d at 639 (stating that "Sinay is not entirely consistent with Virginia
Bankshares" because it failed to consider the truthfulness of the statement); Booze, supra note 19,
at 511.
64. Mayer, 988 F.2d at 639 (highlighting the conflict between the holding of Sinay, that
there shall be no liability if optimistic statements are accompanied by cautionary language, and
Virginia Bankshares, in which the Supreme Court expressed concern about false statements
regardless of any cautionary language (citing Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1097-99; Sinay, 948
F.2d at 1040)).
65. Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Forward-looking
representations are . . . considered immaterial when the defendant has provided the investing
public with sufficiently specific risk disclosures or other cautionary statements concerning the
subject matter of the statements at issue to nullify any potentially misleading effect.").
66. Id.atll21.
67. Id. at 1122-23 (observing that the registration statement contained the cautionary
language, whereas the press releases and interviews that were "obviously directly related to the
transactions" detailed in the registration statement contained the allegedly misleading
predictions). Given the context in which the cautionary statements were made and their degree of
specificity, the court found the documents at issue to be "immaterial statements of corporate
optimism." Id. at 1121.
68. Booze, supra note 19, at 515.
69. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21E(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006); see H.R.
REP. No. 104-369, at 43 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 30, 742 (stating that
the safe harbor is "based on aspects of SEC Rule 175 and the judicially created 'bespeaks
caution' doctrine").
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C. Codification of the Bespeaks-Caution Doctrine: The Statutory Safe-Harbor
Provision for Forward-Looking Statements
Congress's enactment of a statutory safe-harbor provision for
forward-looking statements came about as a means to further one of the federal
securities laws' goals: fraud prevention.o Although the safe harbor
undoubtedly protects public companies,71 it functions equally as a provision
providing investor protection. 72  By protecting forward-looking statements,
Congress is arguably encouraging more reliable corporate disclosures, 73 which
supports the basic purpose of the federal securities laws-attempting to protect
investors. 74
1. Inquiry into the Legislative History of the Statutory Safe Harbor for
Forward-Looking Statements: Necessary, but Not Sufficient
Generally, when a statute is unambiguous on its face, as the case may be
here, consideration of the legislative history is disfavored. Occasionally,
however, courts will look beyond the plain language of a facially unambiguous
statute for guidance in applying it to a particular set of facts.76 Therefore, this
Comment turns to a brief consideration of the enactment of section 21E(c).
70. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(c); Muniz, supra note 19, at 658, 701
(claiming that forward-looking statements are an essential part of capital markets and that the
PSLRA has a "stated goal of encouraging forward-looking disclosure while maintaining investor
protection"); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (explaining that the
Securities Act was designed "to protect investors against fraud and . . . to promote ethical
standards of honesty and fair dealing," while the Exchange Act was enacted to protect investors
through regulation and reporting requirements); Somol, supra note 1, at 266 (stating that the
federal securities laws are intended to protect investors through increased disclosure of
information).
71. See Horwich, supra note 26, at 523-24 (stating that the need to protect public
companies from liability prompted the addition of the PSLRA to the Exchange Act).
72. See Muniz, supra note 19, at 701 ("[B]ecause the cautionary statements must be
meaningful' . . . investors should have more than enough information at their disposal to assess
the likelihood of the forward-looking statement coming to fruition." (citation omitted)).
73. See id. at 700 (noting agreement among legal commentators and courts that the safe
harbor for forward-looking statements provides sufficient protection against securities fraud).
74. See supra note 70.
75. See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("[C]ourts must
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what is says
there." (citations omitted)).
76. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 445 (1989) ("Looking beyond
the naked text for guidance is perfectly proper when the result it apparently decrees is difficult to
fathom or where it seems inconsistent with Congress' intention .... ); see, e.g., Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) ("When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial
inquiry is complete, except 'in 'rare and exceptional circumstances."" (quoting Tenn. Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978))).
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The development of the current safe-harbor provision nearly led to the
demise of the PSLRA.77  Although President William J. Clinton favored the
legislation in most respects,78 he and other opponents of the safe-harbor
provision, including Senators Paul S. Sarbanes and Barbara L. Boxer, along
with Professor John Coffee, an expert in the field of securities laws, objected
that, as written, the safe harbor essentially permitted the dissemination of false
or misleading projections if accompanied by sufficient cautionary language. 79
Senators Sarbanes and Boxer claimed that the current version of the
safe-harbor provision would essentially immunize fraudulent projections from
801civil liability.so Despite these objections, Congress, over presidential veto,8 '
enacted the PSLRA, which included Congress's original safe-harbor
provision.82
2. The Plain Language of the Statutory Safe-Harbor Provision for
Forward-Looking Statements
Under the safe-harbor provision, forward-looking statements may be
protected whether "written or oral."83  Most importantly, the safe-harbor
provision extends to two types of forward-looking statements. Prong A
77. See Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1912, 1912-13 (Dec. 19, 1995)
[hereinafter Veto Message] (vetoing the PSLRA out of fear that the safe harbor would bar
genuinely defrauded investors from any recovery); see also Alfred Wang, Comment, The
Problem of Meaningful Language: Safe Harbor Protection In Securities Class Action Suits After
Asher v. Baxter, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1907, 1917 (2006) (noting that President Clinton vetoed the
bill with just one hour to spare).
78. See Veto Message, supra note 77, at 1912 (indicating the President's general support for
the bill, including certain safe harbor language, but articulating his refusal to sign the legislation
in its then-current form, believing it would result in "investors find[ing] their legitimate claims
unfairly dismissed").
79. See 141 CONG. REC. 38,201 (1995) (expressing concerns that the safe harbor was a
"license to lie," and "even if [a] knowingly false statement is made, the defendant escapes
liability if 'meaningful cautionary statement[s]' are added to the forward-looking statement").
80. See id at 38,198 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) ("Projections by corporate insiders will be
protected, even though they may be unreasonable, misleading, and fraudulent, if accompanied by
boilerplate cautionary language."); id at 38,211 (statement of Sen. Boxer) ("Fraudulent future
predictions and estimates would be permitted under this bill if those defrauding attach 'some'
possible reasons why the prediction might not come true. Those defrauding can hide the real
reason that their fraudulent prediction will not come true and they cannot be sued.").
81. See Muniz, supra note 19, at 690 (discussing the congressional override of President
Clinton's veto on December 22, 1995).
82. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 102, 109 Stat.
737, 749-56 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006)). This Comment focuses on the
safe-harbor provision now in Section 21 E(c) of the Exchange Act, codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-5(c)(1). Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1).
83. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(c)(1).
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protects a statement that is both identified as a forward-looking statement and
also "accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements," 84 or a
forward-looking statement that is "immaterial."s Prong B protects any
forward-looking statement that an injured party "fails to prove . . . was made
with actual knowledge by Ithe person making the statement] that the statement
was false or misleading."8 Within the safe-harbor provision's plain language,
the term of critical importance is the disjunctive term "or" that separates Prong
A from Prong B.87
Because the plain language of the safe-harbor provision expressly makes
Prong A and Prong B independent of one another, it protects all
forward-looking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements,
even if the person making the statement actually knows that it is false or
misleading. Considering the basic premise behind the federal securities
laws, 89 such an antithetical outcome invites arguments for a more amendable
judicial interpretation. 90
II. A FORK IN THE ROAD: CONJUNCTIVE V. DISJUNCTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
SAFE-HARBOR PROVISION
A. Dependent Operation: Courts and Commentary Finding That Prong A and
Prong B of Safe-Harbor Provision for Forward-Looking Statements Should be
Analyzed Conjunctively
Several cases and commentary support the position that Prongs A and B of
the statutory safe-harbor provision should not be read in the disjunctive.91
Such an assertion conflicts with a plain language interpretation, which instead
supports the proposition that the two prongs should be read independently.92
84. Id. § 21E(c)(1)(A)(i).
85. Id. § 21E(c)(1)(A)(ii).
86. Id. § 21E(c)(1)(B)(i).
87. See id. § 21E(c)(I)(A)(ii); see also Horwich, supra note 26, at 557 ("The language of
the statute should be applied as the disjunctive phrases read, with 'meaningful' interpreted
without reference to the speaker's knowledge (much less belief) in the truth or falsity of the
projection.").
88. See Securities Exchange Act of 1943 § 21E(c)(1)(A)(i).
89. See supra notes 1, 5-8, 70 and accompanying text.
90. Cf O'Hare, supra note 2, at 479-80 (noting that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws were enacted to ensure "complete and accurate" disclosures and that a company's
dissemination of materially false or misleading statements would be a violation of one of those
provisions).
91. See infra Parts ll.A.2-3.
92. See infra Part II.B.
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1. The Natural Relationship: A Case Determining Solely Whether
Forward-Looking Statements Are Accompanied by Meaningful Cautionary
Language (Prong A), but Which Inevitably Analyzes the Defendant's State of
Mind (Prong B)
In Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., the Fifth Circuit intertwined Prong A and
Prong B in its analysis.93 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had made
favorable public statements regarding the company's status, despite knowing
that certain changes in its operation posed substantial risks.94 The company
did, however, include cautionary disclaimers that were industry specific and
detailed a number of risks that could potentially hurt the company's financial
stability.95 However, at the time the projections were made, the company was
aware that the offer of such programs was coerced by the network affiliate,
thus proving to be financially unfavorable. 96 The court ultimately held that the
safe-harbor provision was inapplicable because at the pleading stage, "the
plaintiff adequately allege[d] that the defendants actually knew that their
statements were misleading at the time they were made." 97 The court further
determined that the cautionary language included in the disclaimers was
insufficient because it did "not provide sufficiently meaningful caution about
clearly present danger that was materializing."98  Although the court
acknowledged that certain warnings were "somewhat specific," the cautionary
language nonetheless failed to provide a sufficient warning about the risks that
a defendant knew were being realized. 99
Lormand supports the proposition that a proper analysis of Prong A is
dependent upon an analysis of Prong B.o00 However, as additional cases will
demonstrate, some courts have confronted the issue differently, when
determining whether Prongs A and B should be analyzed independently of one
another.
93. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 243, 247 (5th Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants misled the public by concealing material information regarding a risky
business strategy that the defendants knew "would be financially disastrous" for the company. Id.
at 237.
94. Id at 234, 237-38.
95. Id. at 245-46.
96. Id. at 252.
97. Id at 244.
98. Id at 247 ("These warnings failed to correct the false impression created by the
defendants' public statements or to supply the truth that they omitted ... that the defendants knew
that [certain programs and company changes] threatened to severely harm the company
financially by increasing chum and bad debt .....
99. Id
100. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
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2. Cases Holding that Prong A Cannot Be Satisfied If the Statement Is Made
With Actual Knowledge that It Is False or Misleading
Generally, Prong A, unlike Prong B, does not incorporate a subjective
analysis.1ot However, in In re SeeBeyond Technologies Corp. Securities
Litigation, the court determined that an analysis of Prong A must take into
account the defendant's state of mind.102 Moreover, the court cautioned that an
objective standard for Prong A was too high and cut against Congress's
intent.103 Accordingly, after finding that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that
(1) defendants knew that statements made in a press release were false or
misleading, and (2) the cautionary language in the press release did not identify
the risks that made the press release false or misleading, the court concluded
that the safe-harbor provision did not protect the forward-looking statements at
issue. 04
Relying on the analysis from In re SeeBeyond Technologies, the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of California also determined that the
cautionary language at issue was insufficient to warrant safe harbor protection
because the plaintiffs alleged that (1) the defendant's earning projections were
based on the success of a project, and (2) defendant's knew that this project
was not successful. 05  Courts outside the Ninth Circuit also adhere to the
proposition that a statement made with actual knowledge of its falsity cannot
101. See Ann Morales OlazAbal, Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: What's Safe and What's Not?, 105 DICK. L.
REV. 1, 13 n.60 (2000) (discussing the three separate avenues for seeking protection under the
safe-harbor provision: (1) sufficient cautionary language, (2) immateriality, or (3) defendant's
actual knowledge of falsity, and recognizing this third avenue as the only prong that warrants an
inquiry into the speaker's state of mind).
102. See In re SeeBeyond Techs. Corp. Sec. Litig., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165-66 (C.D.
Cal. 2003). The court rejected the idea that a defendant may knowingly make a false statement,
provided that he includes cautionary language:
If the forward-looking statement is made with actual knowledge that it is false or
misleading, the accompanying cautionary language can only be meaningful if it either
states the belief of the speaker that it is false or misleading or, at the very least, clearly
articulates the reasons why it is false or misleading.
Id. at 1165; see also In re Broadcom Corp. Sec. Litig., No. SACV01275GLTMLGX, 2004 WL
3390052, at *3 n.4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2004) (observing that the rationale in SeeBeyond "is sound
and should be adopted by the Ninth Circuit").
103. See In re SeeBeyond, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 n.8 ("If an objective standard is adopted
for determining whether a factor is 'important,' then it seems this would heighten the bar of the
first prong of the safe-harbor provision . .. this result seems contrary to congressional intent.").
104. Id. at 1167. The court articulated that for cautionary language to be "meaningful" and
thus merit safe harbor protection, it must address the statements alleged to be false or misleading.
Id.
105. Rosenbaum Capital, LLC v. McNulty, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1190-91 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
In its articulation of what constitutes "meaningful" cautionary language, the Rosenbaum court
relies on the characterization set forth in In re SeeBeyond. Id. (citing In re SeeBeyond, 266 F.
Supp. 2d at 1165).
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be accompanied by "meaningful" cautionary language. 106  Indeed, the SEC
-107shares a similar view.
3. Cases Holding that No Degree ofMeaningful Cautionary Language Can
Protect a Forward-Looking Statement Made with Actual Knowledge of its
Falsity
Perhaps the strongest pronouncement that Prongs A and B are dependent on
one another was made by the Second Circuit in Milman v. Box Hill Systems
Corp. os In Milman, the court stated "no degree of cautionary language will
protect material misrepresentations or omissions where defendants knew their
statements were false when made."109 Other courts have concurred that if the
defendant knew that the statement was false when made, then the defendant
may not seek cover under the safe-harbor provision, even if the accompanyin
cautionary statements sufficiently address the allegedly false statements.
The Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that "a strong inference of actual knowledge"
106. See, e.g., In re Nash Finch Co., 502 F. Supp. 2d 861, 873 (D. Minn. 2007)
("[C]autionary language can not be 'meaningful' when defendants know that the potential risks
they have identified have in fact already occurred, and that the positive statements they are
making are false.").
107. Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, at 9-10, Slayton v.
Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-5442-cv), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2010/slaytonO110.pdf (taking the position that cautionary
language that identifies a risk is not "meaningful" when the company, at the time that it prepared
the cautionary language, knew that the risk had already been realized).
108. See Milman v. Box Hill Sys. Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 220, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 173 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Cautionary words
about future risk cannot insulate from liability the failure to disclose that the risk has
transpired."); Gargiulo v. Isolagen, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that
cautionary language alone is insufficient under the safe-harbor provision if the defendants had
actual knowledge that the cautionary statements were false); Andropolis v. Red Robin Gourmet
Burgers, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 662, 676 (D. Colo. 2007) (noting that if the plaintiff proves that the
speaker of the misstatement knew of its falsity, the statement is actionable, despite the presence of
any meaningful cautionary language); Primavera v. Liquidmetal Techs., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d
1151, 1159 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (concluding that actual knowledge of falsity vitiates any claim of
safe harbor protection); In re Cambrex Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 03-CV-4896 (WJM), 2005 WL
2840336, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2005) ("Even if the warnings were sufficient, the safe harbor is
not available when the forward-looking statements are made by or with the approval of an
executive officer of that entity who had actual knowledge that the statement was false or
misleading . . . ."); In re Alliance Pharm. Corp. Sec. Litig., 279 F. Supp. 2d 171, 192 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (rejecting the notion that the
safe-harbor provision protects knowingly false statements); Schaffer v. Evolving Sys., Inc., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 1213, 1224 (D. Colo. 1998) (finding that forward-looking statements in a press release
accompanied by sufficient cautionary language "do[] not fall within the PSLRA's safe harbor
provision").
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that a statement is false or misleading removes it from the safe-harbor
provisions completely. II
B. Plain Text Interpretation: Courts and Commentary Finding that the Plain
Language of the Statutory Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements
Requires an Independent Analysis ofProngs A and B
One legal commentator, Allan Horwich, contends that, based on an
examination of legislative history and case law, Prong A and Prong B should
be analyzed independently of each other.112 Although Horwich touches briefly
on the plain-language argument, much of his analysis focuses on the relevance
of inquiring into the speaker's state of mind (Prong B) when considering
whether a forward-looking statement is accompanied with sufficient,
meaningful cautionary language (Prong A)." 3  He concludes that satisfaction
of Prong A-without regard to the speaker's subjective intent-brings a
statement within the purview of the safe-harbor provision.114
In 2004, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion that sparked much debate
about the statutory safe-harbor provision for forward-looking statements.115
Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Asher v. Baxter,
viewed the statutory safe harbor as "a compromise between legislators" that
"lacked spirit," but, nevertheless, recognized that the court "must make
something of it."1 6  The court, solely focusing on Prong A, analyzed the
sufficiency of the cautionary language accompanying a company's profit
projections without an inquiry into the defendant's state of mind (Prong B).1
In 2002, Baxter International Inc. (Baxter) made repeated projections, such as
111. No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp.,
320 F.3d 920, 936, 937 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts taking this approach tend to support the
general premise behind the federal securities laws-that Congress intended to protect investors-
and, therefore, do not permit the dissemination of false or misleading information into the
marketplace, regardless of the degree of cautionary language. See, e.g., id. (commenting that
allowing the safe-harbor provision to protect knowingly false statements "would eviscerate the
1934 Act altogether"); see also supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
112. Horwich, supra note 26, at 559 ("The first prong of the statutory safe harbor for
forward-looking statements should be dispositive where it is satisfied, without requiring that any
doubt or lack of belief about the projection be disclosed in order for the cautionary statements to
be 'meaningful' . . . .").
113. Id. at 529-30 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 43-44 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 742-43) (pointing to the language of the House Report to suggest the
independence of Prongs A and B).
114. Id. at 558.
115. See Asher v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that because a
determination of how "meaningful" cautionary language is requires extensive discovery, such
cases should not be decided at the pleading stage); see also Wang, supra note 77, at 1908
(discussing the impact of Asher in departing from a strict interpretation of the safe-harbor
provision by inquiring into a determination of "meaningfulness").
116. Asher, 377 F.3d at 728, 732-33.
117. Id. at 728, 732-35.
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forecasting that their business would produce revenue growth, eamings-per-
share growth, and cash flow from operating activities of $500 million or
more. Baxter accompanied its projections with cautionary language that was
business specific; however, the plaintiffs alleged that (1) the company did not
amend the language to reflect the company's economic struggles, and (2) the
projections were false because of these difficulties." Judge Easterbrook
concluded that it was inappropriate to find whether Baxter satisfied Prong A of
the safe-harbor provision based solely on the pleadings, and the court reversed
the dismissal of the plaintiffs claim.' 20
In Miller v. Champion Enterprises Inc., the Sixth Circuit had also engaged in
an independent analysis of Prongs A and B.121 Citing the plain language of the
statutory safe-harbor provision, the court in Miller ruled that inquiry into the
speaker's state of mind is "irrelevant" when it comes to Prong A. Thus,
under Miller, so long as a statement is found to be accompanied by meaningful
cautionary statements, it will be within the protection of the safe harbor,
regardless of the defendant's knowledge of its falsity.'23 The First Circuit
expressed concern with the illogical result of a plain-language reading;
however, it found that the safe harbor did not apply on other grounds.124
A district court expressed similar concerns, but ultimately adhered to the
plain language in analyzing the prongs independently of one another.125 Still
other courts adhere to the plain language of the statute without question,
118. Id. at 728.
119. Id.at728-31.
120. Id. at 735. Judge Easterbrook expressed frustration with the ambiguity of Prong A's
"meaningful cautionary statement[l" requirement, commenting that it is unclear what language
would satisfy the standard. Id at 729.
121. 346 F.3d 660, 672 (6th Cir. 2003).
122. Id. at 672 ("[F]or forward-looking statements that are accompanied by meaningful
cautionary language, the first prong of the safe harbor provided for in the PSLRA makes the state
of mind irrelevant." (internal quotations omitted)).
123. Id (stating that forward-looking statements satisfy the requirements of the safe-harbor
provision if they include sufficient cautionary language).
124. See In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 212 (1st Cir. 2005). The
First Circuit found that:
The statute thus seems to provide a surprising rule that the mak[ing] of knowingly false
and willfully fraudulent forward-looking statements, designed to deceive investors,
escapes liability for the fraud if the statement is 'identified as a forward-looking
statement and [was] accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying
important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the
forward-looking statement.
Id (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i)).
125. Desai v. Gen. Growth Props., 654 F. Supp. 2d 836, 843-44 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (discussing
the puzzling idea that Congress would "immunize deliberate liars from liability" but nevertheless
finding that the "unambiguous language" of the statute leads to that result whenever either prong
is satisfied).
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holding that the two prongs should be analyzed independently of one
another.126
The following discussion demonstrates that a plain-language interpretation
of the statutory safe harbor should be rejected because: (1) a determination of
"meaningfulness" with respect to Prong A necessarily involves an analysis of
Prong B, the speaker's state of mind, and (2) such an interpretation would
lead to the impractical result of permitting the dissemination of false or
misleading statements. 26
III. REJECTING THE STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE-HARBOR
PROVISION
This area of the law remains unsettled and calls for consistency among
federal courts in the form of a unified, logical approach to interpreting the
statutory safe harbor for forward-looking statements. 129 This section discusses
the analytical downfalls of a strict plain-text interpretation of the statutory safe
harbor for forward-looking statements by examining the plain language of the
safe-harbor provision, analyzing interpretation of the statute by federal courts,
and consulting its legislative history. o Subsequently, this section maintains
that the analysis conducted by Lormand provides the proper analytical
framework for determining whether forward-looking statements are protected
under the safe-harbor provision.' 3 1 Finally, this section discusses how the safe
harbor's origin in SEC Rule 175 and the bespeaks-caution doctrine support the
theory that false or misleading forward-looking statements should not be
protected, no matter the degree of cautionary language.132
126. See, e.g., Edward J. Goodman Life Income Trust v. Jabil Circuit, Inc., 594 F.3d 783,
795-96 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating "an allegation of actual knowledge of falsity will not deprive a
defendant of protection by the statutory safe harbor if his forward-looking statements are
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language"); Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions
Inc., 365 F.3d. 353, 371 (5th Cir. 2004) (providing dicta supporting a disjunctive analysis by
stating that "[t]he safe harbor has two independent prongs: one focusing on the defendant's
cautionary statements and the other on the defendant's state of mind."); Yellen v. Hake, 437 F.
Supp. 2d. 941, 961 (S.D. Iowa 2006) ("[T]he statute is worded in the disjunctive . . . ."); In re
Midway Games, Inc. Sec. Litig., 332 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1168 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (finding that inquiry
into the second prong is unnecessary if the first prong is satisfied); In re Williams Sec. Litig., 339
F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1220 (N.D. Okla. 2003) ("The safe harbor of the PSLRA provides two primary
paths by which a defendant may avoid liability.").
127. See infra Part III.
128. See infra Part III.
129. See supra Part II.
130. See infra Parts III.A-C.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 160-63.
132. See infra Part Ill.D.
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A. Plain-Language Interpretation Leads to an Illogical Result ofPermitting
the Dissemination ofFalse or Misleading Information in the Marketplace
Generally, courts that find the requirements of Prong A to be independent of
those in Prong B do so by relying on the plain language of the statutory safe
harbor. 133 According to the plain language of the statute, use of the disjunctive
term "or" suggests that Prong A should be assessed independently from Prong
B.134 However, as the Seventh Circuit found in Asher, a case analyzing Prong
A independently, the plain language is not necessarily unambiguous.' 3 5  if
Prong A is the first bite at the apple, the initial determination must be whether
the cautionary statements accompanying the forward-looking statements are
"meaningful."l 36 A determination of what constitutes "meaningful" language
must be made regardless of the grammatical term Congress employed to
separate Prongs A and Prong B. 13 Furthermore, the determination of what
suffices as "meaningful" naturally considers the speaker's state of mind at the
time the statement is made.'38 In essence, there is a bridge connecting Prongs
A and B, which is found within the plain language of the safe-harbor
provision.139 Therefore, a plain-language interpretation is either: (a)
impractical because of ambiguity on the face of the statute, or (b) necessitates
consideration of Prong A and Prong B conjunctively.140
The Fifth Circuit, in Lormand, did not directly address whether Prongs A
and B of the safe-harbor provision should be analyzed together.141 Rather, the
court focused on determining whether there was "meaningful cautionary
language" necessary to bring the relevant statements within the purview of the
133. See, e.g., Miller v. Champion Enter., Inc., 346 F.3d 660, 672 (6th Cir. 2003); Desai v.
Gen. Growth Props., 654 F. Supp. 2d 836, 843-44 (N.D.III. 2009).
134. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006)
(protecting forward-looking statements so long as they are made with "meaningful cautionary
statements" or the plaintiff fails to prove that the person making the statement had actual
knowledge that the statement was false or misleading at the time it was made).
135. See Asher v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the
uncertainty surrounding the safe harbor's requirement that the cautionary language be
"meaningful").
136. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(c)(1)(A)(i) (noting that a determination of
"meaningfulness" is necessary if a defendant seeks protection under Prong A of the safe-harbor
provision).
137. See supra Part II.A.
138. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
139. See Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 247 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing
whether cautionary language was "meaningful" under prong A, by scrutinizing an inquiry of the
defendant's state of mind under Prong B).
140. See supra Parts II.A.2-3.
141. In Lormand, the Fifth Circuit focused on whether forward-looking statements were
accompanied by "meaningful cautionary language." See Lormand, 565 F.3d at 244 (finding that
the forward-looking statements at issue were not protected by the safe harbor because they were
merely "boilerplate").
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safe harbor. 142  However, this determination shifted the court's focus to a
subjective intent analysis1 43 because cautionary language is not "meaningful"
unless it cautions against the false or misleading nature of a forward-looking
statement.144 This intertwined analysis is crucial to understanding the natural
overlap of Prong A and Prong B.
B. The Safe-Harbor Provision's Legislative History: A Vigorous Debate
Legal commentator Allan Horwich reviews the legislative history of the
PSLRA to support his proposition that Prong A does not necessitate an inquiry
into the defendant's state of mind as under Prong B.145 However, reliance on
the legislative history in interpreting the statute is exactly what caused the
President to veto the PSLRA and the accompanying safe-harbor provision.146
In addition to the concerns of President Clinton, the Senate also engaged in a
debate regarding the language of the safe-harbor provision.14 7  Even the
Seventh Circuit chimed in when Judge Easterbrook highlighted the lack of
clarity in the safe-harbor provision in Asher, calling it "a compromise between
legislators."l 4 8
Although, it is understandable to inquire into the safe-harbor provision's
legislative history for guidance, supporting an interpretation based on
legislative history is inadvisable, especially when the statute went through such
contentious and "extensive" debate.' 49  Furthermore, the legislative history
mentions that the statutory safe harbor comes from the same family as SEC
Rule 175 and the bespeaks-caution doctrine.150  Thus, to consider the
legislative history, one must consider it in conjunction with SEC Rule 175 and
142. Id.
143. See id at 247 (deciding that the cautionary language accompanying the
forward-looking statement at issue was not "meaningful" because it failed to warn the public that
the speaker knew the statements at issue were potentially false or misleading).
144. See id
145. Horwich, supra note 26, at 530.
146. Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary
Warnings in Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 929, 946 (discussing
President Clinton's veto of the PSLRA due to concerns that the language in the legislative history
would "water[] down" key aspects of the safe-harbor provision).
147. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text; see also Horwich, supra note 26, at
530-35 (detailing Congress's vigorous debate on the PSLRA).
148. Asher v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2004).
149. See Horwich, supra note 26, at 530 (referencing the disagreements between legislators
over the implications of passing the bill with disjunctive language during the floor debates for the
PSLRA).
150. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 43 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 745 (denoting that the safe harbor is "based on aspects of SEC Rule 175 and the judicial
created 'bespeaks caution' doctrine").
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the bespeaks-caution doctrine, and their impact on the interpretation of the
statutory safe harbor for forward-looking statements. 51
C. Strict Interpretation and the "Illogical" Result
The circuit courts are split on whether the two prongs of the statutory safe
harbor should be read together or separately.' 52  The Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits have strongly opined that satisfaction of Prong A makes an analysis of
Prong B irrelevant. However, the Fifth Circuit intertwined the analysis of
Prongs A and B when analyzing only meaningful cautionary language (Prong
A), but it inevitably analyzed the subjective intent and knowledge of the
speaker.154  In Asher, the Seventh Circuit analyzed Prong A exclusively;
nonetheless, the court noted the fundamental difficulty in analyzing Prong A
independently because of the ambiguity in interpreting the word
"meaningful.',s Finally, the First Circuit interpreted the provision in a way
that suggests that Prong A does not encompass a subjective intent element;
however, it acknowledged the puzzling result that such an interpretation would
have in application.'s5
Reluctance in applying the statute's plain language is warranted because of
the illogical and impractical result of creating a "license to lie."' 57 Companies
can disguise false or misleading projections with cautionary language that a
court may deem "meaningful" if the prongs are analyzed independently.
The Sixth Circuit may stand as the only unblemished support of treating the
prongs disjunctively, as even the Eleventh Circuit has issued varying decisions
on this point.159
151. See supra Parts I.A-B.
152. See infra Part Il.
153. See, e.g., Edward J. Goodman Life Income Trust v. Jabil Circuit, Inc., 594 F.3d 783,
795-96 (11th Cir. 2010) ("[A]n allegation of actual knowledge of falsity will not deprive a
defendant of protection by the statutory safe harbor if his forward-looking statements are
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language"); Miller v. Champion Enter., Inc., 346 F.3d
660, 672 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[I]f the statement qualifies as 'forward-looking' and is accompanied by
sufficient cautionary language, a defendant's statement is protected regardless of the actual state
of mind." (emphasis added)).
154. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 247 (5th Cir. 2009).
155. See Asher v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating "a word such
as 'meaningful' resists a concrete rendition and thus makes administration of the safe harbor
difficult if not impossible").
156. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
157. See 141 CONG. REc. 38,201 (1995) (internal quotations omitted).
158. Id; see, e.g., Miller, 346 F.3d at 672 (concluding that because the first prong was
satisfied, the defendants were protected under the safe-harbor provision irrespective of the
evidence suggesting the defendants knew that the forward-looking statements were false).
159. Edward J. Goodman Life Income Trust v. Jabil Circuit, Inc., 594 F.3d 783, 795-96
(11th Cir. 2010) (conceding that sufficient cautionary language will suffice to defeat a claim that
the defendants had actual knowledge of the statements' falsity when seeking cover under the
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Lormand provides a proper and complete analysis of the safe-harbor
provision because it considers the safe harbor in its entirety, applying the
language to factual circumstances to produce a sound result.160 A holding that
the two prongs overlap, or that satisfaction of Prong A does not foreclose an
analysis of Prong B, avoids the unwelcome result of permitting false or
misleading statements. 161 Lormand applies the statutory language to the facts
and develop a natural nexus between the two prongs. 162 Therefore, courts
following the Lormand analysis will logically conclude that Prong A is
dependent, at least in part, on the analysis of Prong B.163 This form of analysis
not only avoids the concerns of using the plain-language approach,164 it also
ensures that the dissemination of potentially false of misleading information is,
at the very least, known by investors.1 65
D. SEC Rule 175 and the Bespeaks-Caution Doctrine Support the
Interpretation that False or Misleading Statements Are Not Protected by the
Statutory Safe-Harbor Provision
Before the enactment of the statutory safe-harbor provision, the bespeaks-
caution doctrine addressed the current issue.166 Given the fact that the
safe-harbor provision is a codified version of the bespeaks-caution doctrine, it
is instructive to examine the interpretation supported by the common law
doctrine.167 Perhaps the best guidance comes from In re Prudential v.
Securities Inc., Ltd. Partnership Litigation, which advised that a mere
perfunctory warning is insufficient to warrant the protection of bespeaks
caution when the cautioner is fully aware of the grave danger that lies ahead.168
safe-harbor provision); cf Primavera Investors v. Liquidmetal Techs., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d
1151, 1159 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (rejecting the application of the safe-harbor provision when
statements were made with meaningful cautionary statements, but the plaintiff "allege[d] actual
knowledge of falsity").
160. See supra Parts lI.A.1-2.
161. See Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 247 (5th Cir. 2009).
162. See Asher v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 2004) ("A safe harbor matters
only when the firm's disclosures . . . are false or misleadingly incomplete; yet whenever that
condition is satisfied, one can complain that the cautionary statement must have been inadequate.
The safe harbor loses its function.").
163. See id.; see also Lormand, 565 F.3d at 247.
164. See Desai v. Gen Growth Props., Inc., 654 F.2d 836, 843-44 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(questioning whether Congress "intended to immunize deliberate liars from liability," but
nonetheless concluding that it did).
165. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text (underscoring investor protection through
disclosure as the primary goal of the federal securities laws).
166. See supra Parts l.B. 1-2 (discussing the origin and development of the bespeaks-caution
doctrine).
167. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 43 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 742 (stating that the safe harbor draws on characteristics of SEC Rule 175 and the
bespeaks-caution doctrine).
168. In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P'ships. Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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Courts analyzing Prongs A and B independently fail to consider that cautionary
statements are immaterial if they are made with actual knowled e of falsity
and thus should not be protected under the safe-harbor provision. 16
Before courts employed the bespeaks-caution doctrine, the SEC expressed
concerns about the reliability of projections and indicated its willingness to put
unsophisticated investors at a disadvantage. 170 When the SEC promulgated
Rule 175, good faith and a reasonable basis became prerequisites for protection
of a forward-looking statement.171 The SEC's reluctance to extend protection
to projections, coupled with Rule 175's good-faith requirement, suggests that
actual knowledge of a statement's falsity would likely bar protection,
regardless of cautionary language accompanying it.172  Even the Advisory
Committee recommended that the Commission monitor companies to ensure
that projections were truthful and not misleading.173
Originally, the idea of protecting forward-looking statements was met with
reluctance because of the SEC's concerns regarding the reliability of such
statements.174 In response, the SEC's rationale was thoroughly examined by
the Advisory Committee and the SEC subsequently implemented Rule 175,
with the necessary precautions to guard against issues of reliability.7  After
the promulgation of Rule 175, the judicially created protection for
forward-looking statements developed through the bespeaks-caution doctrine,
which implied that cautionary language alone does not save a statement known
to be false or misleading.176 Finally, there is some evidence that the statutory
safe harbor is derived from the SEC's investigations and the bespeaks-caution
doctrine." Therefore, it is hard to imagine that Congress intended to do away
with concerns of reliability, good faith, and the bespeaks-caution doctrine by
requiring a strict interpretation of the current safe-harbor provision for
forward-looking statements. 7 8
169. See supra Part Ill.A (concluding that the "meaningful" determination is dependent upon
a subjective intent analysis).
170. See Exchange Act Release No. 34831, supra note 30.
171. Barondes, supra note 28, at 249.
172. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(a)-(b) (2009); Barondes, supra note 28, at 49 (addressing the
required safeguards under Rule 175).
173. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 38, at 344.
174. See Exchange Act Release No. 34831, supra note 30 (noting that the SEC prohibited
forward-looking statements because of their unreliability).
175. See supra Part.I.A. (discussing the promulgation of Rule 175 and the Advisory
Committee's Contribution thereto).
176. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the judicial evolution of the bespeaks-caution doctrine
and the required injury into the misleading nature of the forward-looking statements).
177. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing how the safe harbor reflects the
SEC's concerns and the bespeaks-caution doctrine).
178. See Exchange Act Release No. 34831, supra note 30; Barondes, supra note 28, at 249;
see also Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 171 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd.
P'ships Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean,
11072011]
Catholic University Law Review
IV. CONCLUSION
The statutory safe-harbor provision for forward-looking statements can be an
asset for both publicly-traded companies and the investing public. However,
the plain-language interpretation of the statutory safe harbor, based solely on a
disjunctive term, will invite fraudulent behavior and deter investor confidence
in the securities markets. Even if the statute appears to be facially
unambiguous, judicial interpretation illustrates that there is some ambiguity in
the statute's language. This ambiguity necessitates an analysis of Prong A in
conjunction with the subjective element of Prong B.
Although some circuits strictly adhere to the text, such an analysis is
incomplete and ignores application of the text to factual analysis. Cases that
followed plain-text interpretation were rightfully reluctant to do so. The SEC's
primary concern from the outset of this legislation was to ensure truthfulness,
as were the initial judicial decisions surrounding the bespeaks-caution doctrine.
The evidence does not support a conclusion that Congress could have intended
for sophisticated, publicly traded companies to be permitted to disseminate
false or misleading statements into the public marketplace under the guise of
sufficient cautionary language. Therefore, the statutory safe-harbor provision
should not protect forward-looking statements that are made by a speaker with
knowledge that they are false or misleading, even when accompanied by
meaningful cautionary language.
640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983)) (stating
that cautionary language cannot protect false or misleading statements that were made
knowingly).
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